The Mask of Command

Prior to the publication of "The Face of Battle", much of military history focused on leaders and not on the led, set pieces and "macro" developments. With "The Mask of Command", Keegan returns from the raw shellshock of combat and furnishes four accounts of famous military leaders. However, his focus is not on strategic or tactical decisions, but on how these men led, the theatre and persona that these leaders cultivated to provide the trust and moral fiber which motivated their men. This is what Keegan means by "the mask" -- the image, the spirit, the incarnation of what subordinates needed to believe in order to fight. It is in some sense combative to claim that this persona is a "mask" -- that is, an artifice contrived to motivate and not strictly who these leaders "were". To some extent, it is impossible to know what any historical figure actually "was", or simply what we even "are", but in any event, these particular leaders had very interesting masks and Keegan does a superb job in each account.Clearly, if a leader is to be effective he must have the respect and trust of his men. The problem is that the mechanisms for gaining this respect are either fraught with personal peril, require the embodiment of a cause which is rarely stain-free, or rest upon a non-trivial ideological framework. The simplest starting point, then, is to answer Keegan's question, "In front: always, sometimes, or never". "In front" always has the advantage of pressing home the point to the men that the leader is bold, unafraid to assume the same risks as his men for a purpose in which he must clearly believe. "In front" also has the disadvantage of placing the leader in mortal danger. So a complication arises, namely, that good leaders are rare and precious, that losing them does a belligerent no good, but that to eschew personal risk is to court mistrust. Alexander, Keegan's first case study, chose "in front". He was able to do so in part because early warfare did not have the lethality of later warfare -- arrows rarely hit their mark and skill at arms could tell in the local heat of combat. Alexander could thus afford it, but he too felt it incumbent to act more and more heroically, i.e., to take increasingly greater risks the more he demanded of his men, finally risking too much and losing his life. Wellington opted for "sometimes", rushing about from regiment to regiment at Waterloo, courting stray musket balls and grapeshot at every turn, exhorting and directing at all times. Still, he did not lead from the front, which was probably a wise decision when impersonal bullets could kill men in swaths. Grant more-or-less chose "never", as did Hitler.The issue then arises for all leaders, but especially for those leaders who chose "never", to find other means of gaining trust and belief. Alexander would engage in dramatic antics, spending days in his tent in peevish anticipation of apology, and would don fabulous armor for engagements. Oration and rhetoric were vital to his success as he attempted to hearten at least a portion of his men. Wellington cultivated the persona of the stoic gentleman warrior, an iron will of perfection, fair to all but intolerant of sloppiness. Grant cultivated the image of being "one of the boys" -- surrounding himself with home-town friends, spurring his men by honestly showing them his hangdog vulnerability, and by relying on his men's belief in the justice of the Union cause - they were, after all, citizen-soldiers, volunteers, men of conviction.Hitler's leadership required the constant bolstering of a seductive ideology, endless infusions of propaganda. Belief in his command was cemented by the ceaseless exhortations of Goebbels. Like the uncreative and largely ineffective generals of WWI, Hitler hid in secret bunkers while his men died far away. That Hitler could get away with it for so long and so successfully was largely due to the dramatic improvements in communications, but also through the constant retelling of the Fuhrer's heroism in WWI. Ultimately, Hitler was not a hero, but a false god whose command withered with the monstrous dream of the Third Reich and his distance from the realities of the front. Here, Keegan does a particularly fine job detailing Hitler's neurotic infantilism, his growing separation from reality, his insecure sense of isolation, and his final ignominious demise."The Mask of Command" is readable, compelling, and perhaps the most flawless of all of Keegan's histories. Quality, not quantity is the motto here. A brilliant and absorbing treatise.

John Keegan, one of the premier military historians of the 20th century ( and early 21st), wrote this as a comparative study of wartime leadership through various epochs of history, studying Alexander the Great, The Duke of Wellington, Grant, and Hitler. While I would have liked to read about some heroes from the Middle Ages (a noticeable gap in this is the only flaw I can think of) but it serves to ask very important questions about the cultural impact on leadership. The introduction, and this is key, emphasises that he is not seeking a universal or general idea of leadership but rather a number of examples of how leadership and wartime actions are a function of culture and society as much as of individual will. In this way, he distances himself from the social sciences (even if he does use their ideas in theories in many of his books) and makes it clear that in no way was Alexander's command style universal in his time for example, even if it was the expectation of warrior cultures as well as number of other factors.As other reviewers have stated perhaps the most interesting narrative was Hitler's. My area of interest does not usually fall to the World Wars, as I much prefer to learn about antiquity, but I found his to be the most enlightening and informative. It was refreshing also to learn about Hitler in his downtime, something I know is studied but have not really come across myself, and how he commanded the military of Germany. The idea that culture affects military actions is not an entirely new concept, even at the publishing of this book several decades ago, but it is one that many non-historians don't often think about. Getting specific examples of this is very enlightening. Also, I felt that of Keegan's books that I have read (Face of Battle and History of Warfare with plans to read many more) this is the most accesible and perhaps useful to those who arn't military buffs.

Dr. Keegan has another masterpiece. This book details leadership styles and techniques by answering a very simple question: "In front? Always, sometimes, never?" The historical perspective on the question is provided in 4 fascinating biographies of Alexander the Great, Wellington, Grant, and Hitler. Amazingly little changed in terms of how war was fought between Alexander and Wellington and yet the cultural impact of their societies had profound impact on their power of authority and the means in which they wielded it. I personally found the biography of Grant to be the most interesting and how the influence of rifled muskets and the large presence of cannon drove commanders farther from the front line and how democratic society supported that removal of "shared risk". Hitler's biography clarified a great deal of history and myth that I had not read previously: Hitler actually had a much more distinguished career as a soldier than I had previously understood and that had a profound effect on his understanding and misunderstanding of the circumstances of the Second World War. Hitler appeared to understand a large portion of the mechanisms of leadership and warfare but misunderstood the key lessoned to be learned from the First World War: that the leader on the scene is often capable of the best decisions.The text effortless weaves these historical perspectives into a short, concise study of leadership styles and requirements and then presents a clear thesis on leadership in the nuclear age. This thesis is truly terrifying in light of the implications of history; our origins appear to contradict the requirements for future survival. This text is as much a study in leadership and management styles as it is a military science text. It is well written and highly enjoyable. If only we could get Dr. Keegan to add an addendum to leadership in the age of stateless terror.

I was fortunate to have heard Dr.Keegan speak once and talk to him for several hours afterwards.What a professor of history he was.Sadly the world lost him just recently,but you did not loss him as his books are still here.This book deals with the mind of having to lead in the strategic sense more over the tactic sense like say 'Band of Brothers' Major Winter's.

Great book.

Good condition

The late John Keegan was rightly regarded as one of Britain's finest military writers. This is perhaps not his deepest work but it does provide eloquent portraits of four very different styles of generalship, Alexander, Wellington, Grant and Hitler. As usual, it is beautifully written. Recommended.

This book is one of the best books on Military history. Unfortunately both sellers named above provided me very cheap quality of this book. uRead provided me a copy which was clearly a xerox or cheaply printed copy. Global book store provided a copy which was not kept properly & totally different from what was displayed. Pages are completely yellow. Very poor and cheap behavior by both the sellers.